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switching costs and profitability. The main result is that bank size measured by total assets is 
has a complex relationship with switching costs. Competition between small banks creates the 
incentive for lock-in and increased switching costs whereas very large banks are less 
exercised by lock-in and switching costs. The study also finds that concentration has a 
negative relationship with switching costs and profitability, confirming the accepted view that 
the large state-owned banks are concerned with social as well as profit objectives.  
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1. Introduction 
Switching costs in banking represents a source of rent that reduces the competitiveness of the 
market. In addition to the administrative costs of changing a bank account, it is conjectured 
that in the loan market there are additional costs associated with informational asymmetries 
where the existing lender is more informed about the quality of the borrower than a potential 
new lender. Switching costs in the Chinese banking market is a relatively unexplored area of 
research. It can be argued that in a highly competitive and  homogeneous market as in China a 
borrower may face non-negligible switching costs when switching between banks as a means 
of ‘locking in’ customers.  
The Chinese banking market is large and expanding. By the end of 2011 there were 
over 400 banks operating in China. However, there has been little in the way of research that 
investigates the topic of switching costs in the banking sector. What has been published 
focuses on the credit card or deposit market using survey data or macro data. While these 
studies recognize the significance of switching costs on banks’ market share and profits, there 
has been no study of switching costs in the loan market, or its determination. 
     This paper seeks to fill this gap in the applied literature and enhance the 
understanding of the magnitude of switching costs in the loan market and its influence on 
profits in China’s banks. The objective of this paper is twofold. Since switching costs are 
heterogeneously across banks and cannot be observed, this paper applies the structural model 
developed by Shy (2002) to measure the switching costs for each bank in the data sample. 
Second, it analyzes the determinants of the magnitudes of switching costs in the Chinese 
banking sector and their effects on banks’ profits in a simultaneous equations system. The 
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objective of the paper is to identify the principal drivers of switching costs in the Chinese 
banking sector.  
This paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the characteristic of 
the Chinese banking industry; section 3 reviews the relevant theoretical foundation and the 
literature on switching costs; section 4 describes the methodology of the relationship between 
switching costs and competition, section 5 introduces the empirical model and describes the 
data; section 6 presents the results of estimation; and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Chinese banking market 
The Chinese banking industry has been in a state of reform since 1978. Numerous papers 
have described the Chinese banking market in detail and it is not the intention of this paper to 
repeat the same here. We instead focus on the key elements of the banking sector that is 
germane to the empirical research reported herein. The entry of China to WTO gave an 
additional impetus to the process of banking sector reform. In 2003, the Chinese National 
People's Congress approved the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, 
which replaced the Central bank’s regulatory function of financial market. In the same year 
the Law of banking supervision was promulgated.  
The commercial banking market can be separated into large commercial banks (state 
owned banks – SOBs), joint-stock commercial banks (JSBs), city commercial bank (CCBs), 
rural commercial banks (RCBs) and foreign banks (FBs). Despite the seemingly diverse 
nature of the banking market, more than half of market share is dominated by the five large 
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commercial banks. However, with the growth of other types of banks and competition of the 
market, the five large commercial banks’ market share keep decreasing, shrinking from 
69.63% in 2003 to 54.89% in 2011. Since China entered into WTO in 2001, the joint-stock 
banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks have been increasing their market share at 
the expense of the SOBs. 
Recapitalization, profitability and cost efficiency have been joint objectives of the 
SOBs aided by international listing1, global outreach and acceptance of strategic foreign 
investors (Justin Y. Lin et al, 2012). Profitability of the non-SOB sector has improved as has 
their productivity and efficiency (Matthews and Zhang, 2010). The reform process has been 
extended to loan pricing and limited loan rate differentiation between banking entities became 
a possibility since 2004. Table 1 shows the development of interest rate deregulation in China 
banking market. In 1996, loan rate margins on the benchmark loan rate set by the PBOC was 
a tight 0.9 to 1.1. In 1999, this rate range extended to 0.9-1.3 of the benchmark to small and 
medium enterprise, while kept same for large enterprise. However, in 2004, the upper limit of 
loan rate had been moved as well as the lower limit of deposit rate. Hence, banks are almost 
free to price according to risk and market conditions.  
In small steps, Chinese banks have been experiencing limited loan rate differential 
pricing capability since the beginning of the reform period.  Table 1 suggests that since 2004 
Chinese banks have the capability to price differentiate and use the loan rate for strategic 
                                                          
1 BOCOM was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2005, and on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
in May 2007; CCB was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in Oct 2005, and on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in Sep 2007; BOC was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2006, and on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in July2006; ICBC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges 
Oct, 2006; ABC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in July, 2010. 
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pricing to attract and ‘lock-in’ customers by developing switching costs. 
Table 1:  Interest Rate Deregulation 
Year Loan Deposit 
1996 All enterprises: 0.9-1.1 of benchmark rate Equal to the benchmark rate 
1998 
Medium and large enterprise: 0.9-1.1 
times; small enterprise: 0.9-1.2 times 
Equal to the benchmark rate 
1999 
Large enterprise: 0.9-1.1 times; small and 
medium enterprise: 0.9-1.3 times 
Equal to the benchmark rate 
January 2004 All enterprises: 0.9-1.7 times Equal to the benchmark rate 
October 2004 0.9 times - Upper limit removed. No lower limit-benchmark rate 
Sources: Podpiera (2006) 
 
3. Literature Review 
The concept of switching costs can be traced to Porter (1980). Numerous theoretical studies 
explore the effects of consumer’s switching behavior on firms’ competition strategy and 
market outcome. Klemperer (1995) summarizes the relevant literature and concludes that, in 
general, switching costs for consumers exist in many markets resulting in higher market 
prices. Sharpe (1990) proposes a model of borrowing under asymmetric information to 
explain borrower loyalty. It is suggested that banks make the best offers to their existing 
borrowers because they know the quality of their customers better than their competitors. 
Customers are then ‘informational captured’ by their own banks, and will thus be charged 
higher price if they switch, since they are unable to transfer their quality information to new 
banks. Vesala (2007) distinguishes between switching costs and the informational advantage 
gained in the banking-firm relationship, and examines how switching costs affect the 
profitability from relationship based lending. The value of the informational advantage is non-
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linear in profitability, firstly decreasing and then increasing due to the size of switching costs. 
Very low switching costs discourage competing banks from making offers, since it increases 
the probability of low quality borrowers to switch banks, but very high switching costs, lock 
in high quality borrowers to their current bank and make it costly for competitor banks to 
extract rents.  
Empirical studies have focused on the relationship between switching costs, bank 
lending and the bank-customer relationship. Hubbard et al. (2002) use a matched sample of 
individual loans, borrowers, and banks with contract-level loan data of US to find that small 
firms or firms with no bond rating will face higher loan rate when switching between banks. 
The existence of asymmetric information underpins switching costs for small firms. Stango 
(2002) examines the credit card market and investigates the relationship between price setting 
and consumer switching costs. Using a detailed panel of credit card issuers, it is found that 
switching costs are an important influence on pricing for commercial banks, but have almost 
no influence on pricing for credit unions. Waterson (2003) compares switching behavior 
among different industries and finds that borrowers in the banking industry are much less 
likely to switch than those in other industries.  
Kim et al. (2003) apply a novel model to Norwegian bank-level data to estimate the 
magnitude of switching costs for customers. It is claimed that switching costs are encountered 
when firms open a new relationship with its current main banks, or when firms switch to a 
lender that is one of its non-main banks in the previous period. The empirical result shows 
that switching costs on average are about one-third of the average lending rate2. Santos and 
                                                          
2 They take switching costs as homogenous among banks and evaluate the average value for the whole 
banking industry. 
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Winton (2008) use contract-level loan data to find that during a recession, bank-dependent 
firms without accessibility to the bond market pay significantly higher loan rates than those 
firms with accessibility. This indicates the bank-dependent firms pay a rent to the banks in 
respect of their information monopoly. But firms with access to the bond market pay lower 
spreads. It follows that spreads rise significantly less in recessions, which suggest that the 
macro economy is likely to affect the magnitude of switching costs. With bank-firm level data 
on four Italian local credit markets, Barone et al. (2011) show that firms tend to  borrow from 
their main bank over time because of the lock-in effect of switching costs.  
Since switching costs cannot be observed directly, other studies have focused on 
methods of estimating switching costs. According to Kim et al. (2003), the average cost of 
switching in the market costs can be estimated parametrically using a model based on bank 
loans, market share, interest rate, and net interest margin. Shy (2002) constructs a ‘quick-and-
easy’ way to calculate consumer switching costs in a given industry based on the Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium model. Concluding that consumers’ switching costs will be determined 
by price setting mechanisms and the market share of firms, Shy (2002) evaluates switching 
costs for the largest four banks in Finland.  
     Studies of switching costs in the Chinese banking sector focus on the deposit and 
credit card markets3. Su (2007) compares the competition between local banks and foreign 
banks. It is argued that as new-comers, the absence of a branch network makes it harder for 
foreign banks to suck-in and lock-in customers. Su and Chen (2009) use survey data to study 
the determinations of switching costs in the deposit market based on individual and banks 
                                                          
3 For a survey see Chen (2011) 
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characteristics. Switching costs are separated into four types, which are transaction costs, 
learning costs, uncertainty costs and relationship costs4. A questionnaire analysis is conducted 
to determine the key factors affecting the switching decision. Similarly, Yu et al. (2008) focus 
on the relationship of banks and consumers, to evaluate the effect of switching costs on the 
consumers’ decision to change deposit accounts. The empirical results show that switching 
costs have a negative effect on consumers’ switching actions. They find that the stronger the 
bank-client relationship, the lower the consumers’ switching probability.  
     Chun-Yu Ho (2007) adds transaction costs to a static demand model to explore 
whether the switching costs influences consumer preferences. The results show that 
consumers face switching costs when changing providers and depositors prefer banks with 
more branch locations and higher quality employees. In an improved model, Chun-Yu Ho 
(2009) studies the relationship between switching costs and the demand for deposits in China. 
Using provincial data for the big four banks in China it is shown that switching cost is an 
important factor in the choice of bank choice, and consumer need to stand 5% of their deposit 
value loss as switching costs when they switch to other banks. Meanwhile, the research finds 
that banks reduce their service fees to attract consumers initially followed by the expectation 
of earning more from the same consumers in the future.  
 
 4. Methodology  
                                                          
4
 The results show that the bank-client relationship and service quality significantly affect the switching 
costs, and young people are more likely to have lower switching costs than old people. 
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Models of switching cost are typically based on the two-period models of Klemperer (1987a, 
b), set in a Bertrand competition framework. Based on Shy (2002), we describe the model 
used to construct switching costs. There are two firms A and B competing Bertrand style with 
brand A and brand B products respectively. The marginal costs of the two firms are assumed 
to be 0. Consumers are distributed between the firms so that initially 𝑁𝐴 consumers have 
already purchased brand A and 𝑁𝐵 consumers have already purchased brand B. All 
consumers face switching costs, SC > 0, if they wish to change supplier. The utility function 
of each consumer type derived from the next purchase is given by: 
                𝐴 ≝ {
−𝑃𝐴              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐴
−𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶   𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵
                     (1) 
 
                  𝐵 ≝ {
−𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶    𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴
−𝑃𝐵              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐵
                     (2) 
If firm A wishes to poach customers form firm B it has to offer a lower price than firm B 
does. Furthermore, the price difference has to be larger than the switching cost S to make it 
worth for consumers to switch. Let 𝑁𝐴 denote the (endogenously determined) number of 
brand A buyers (the next period purchase), and 𝑁𝐵 denote the number of brand B buyers (the 
next period purchase). Then, (1) and (2) implies that 
        𝑁𝐴 = {
0                               𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 > 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑆𝐶 
𝑁𝐴         𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 ≤ 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑆𝐶
𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵                  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 < 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶
                  (3) 
        𝑁𝐵 = {
0                               𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 > 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑆𝐶 
𝑁𝐵         𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 𝑃𝐵 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑆𝐶
𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵                  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐵 < 𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶
                  (4) 
Assume that firms’ production costs are zero. Denote 𝜋𝐴 and 𝜋𝐵 as the profit of firm A and B. 
Thus, the profits of each firm are given as: 
         𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵) = 𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐵 and 𝜋𝐵(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵) = 𝑃𝐵𝑁𝐵               (5) 
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A Nash-Bertrand equilibrium would be a pair of non-negative prices {𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵}. For a given 𝑃𝐵, 
firm A chooses 𝑃𝐴 to maximize 𝜋𝐴, and symmetrically for firm B to maximize 𝜋𝐵. Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium does not exist in pure strategies, but an undercut-proof equilibrium does. 
According to Shy (2002) definition 1: Firm i is said to undercut firm j, if it sets its price to 
𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝐶, I = A, B and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, That is, if firm i ‘subsidizes’ the switching cost of firm j’s 
customers. 
     Prices represent an undercut-proof equilibrium if it is impossible for any firm to 
increase profits by undercutting the competitor while it is impossible for any firm to raise its 
price without being profitably undercut by the competitor. The undercut-proof property is 
formally designed (definition) as in Shy (2002):   
    A pair of prices {𝑃𝐴
𝑈, 𝑃𝐵
𝑈} satisfies the undercut-proof property (UPP) if  (a) For a given 𝑃𝐵
𝑈 
and 𝑁𝐵
𝑈, firm A chooses the highest price 𝑃𝐴
𝑈 subject to the constraint;  
          𝜋𝐵
𝑈 = 𝑃𝐵
𝑈𝑁𝐵
𝑈 ≥ (𝑃𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵)                (6) 
(b) For a given 𝑃𝐴
𝑈 and 𝑁𝐴
𝑈, firm B chooses the highest price 𝑃𝐵
𝑈 subject to the constraint  
          𝜋𝐴
𝑈 = 𝑃𝐴
𝑈𝑁𝐴
𝑈 ≥ (𝑃𝐵 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵)                 (7) 
Firm A sets the highest price possible in order to maximize profits, but the price is still 
sufficiently low to prevent firm B from undercutting and taking the whole market. Firm A’s 
price is set low enough to make firm B’s profit from not undercutting, 𝑃𝐵
𝑈𝑁𝐵
𝑈 larger than the 
profit firm B would make when undercutting and capturing the whole market, (𝑃𝐴
𝑈 −
𝑆𝐶)(𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵). But since both firms set prices as high as possible, the inequalities hold as 
equalities. These equalities give the unique pair of prices {𝑃𝐴
𝑈, 𝑃𝐵
𝑈} where      
                       𝑃𝐴
𝑈 =
(𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)(𝑁𝐴+2𝑁𝐵)∗𝑆𝐶
(𝑁𝐴)2+𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐵+(𝑁𝐵)2
                       (8) 
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and 
                    𝑃𝐵
𝑈 =
(𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)(2𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵)∗𝑆𝐶
(𝑁𝐴)2+𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐵+(𝑁𝐵)2
                        (9) 
Then solve for the switching costs based on undercut-proof equilibrium. Inserting equations 
(6) and (7) in the equalities of definition gives that 𝑁𝐴
𝑈 = 𝑁𝐴 and 𝑁𝐵
𝑈 = 𝑁𝐵. The solution for 
switching costs given as follow: 
                 𝑆𝐶𝐴 = 𝑃𝐴 −
𝑃𝐵𝑁𝐵
𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵
                       (10) 
                 𝑆𝐶𝐵 = 𝑃𝐵 −
𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵
                       (11) 
     Shy (2002) extends the model described above to a multi-firm industry for estimating 
switching cost using merely information on market shares and prices, which is based on a 
solution to the non-existence of a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. In the case of banks, we replace 
price by the average lending interest rate. Define 𝑆𝑖 to be the switching cost of a brand i 
consumer, and assume that 𝑆𝑖 (i=1,2,……L) are known by all firms and consumers. Then, 
each firm 𝑖 ≠ 𝐿 takes 𝑃𝐿 as given and sets maximal 𝑃𝑖 to satisfy:  
                   𝜋𝐿 = 𝑃𝐿𝑁𝐿 ≥ (𝑃𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑖)(𝑁𝑖 +𝑁𝐿)         (12) 
Accordingly switching costs is given as: 
                                                  𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −
𝑃𝐿𝑡𝑁𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                        (13) 
, where the switching costs of bank 𝑖 is estimated as a function of the average interest P set by 
bank 𝑖 and 𝐿, and the market share of bank 𝑖 and 𝐿 at period t. 𝑃𝐿𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐿𝑡  denote the average 
interest rate and market share of bank L which has the lowest market share in period t 
respectively. Assume that the firm with the smallest market share, firm L, is prey target of 
firm 1. Therefore, the price 𝑃𝐿 of firm L would make undercutting its price by firm 1 
unprofitable. That is, 
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        𝜋1 = 𝑃1𝑁1 ≥ (𝑃𝐿 − 𝑆𝐶𝐿)(𝑁1 +𝑁𝐿)        (14) 
Since 𝑃𝐿𝑡 is observed, the unobserved remaining switching cost 𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑡 can be solved by treating 
equation (12) as an equality. Thus the switching costs of the bank that has the lowest market 
share at period t can be estimated as:  
        𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = 𝑃𝐿𝑡 −
𝑃1𝑡𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                (15) 
     Switching costs arise mainly from asymmetric information which contains two 
aspects, - information asymmetry in the bank-borrower relationship and lack of information 
sharing between banks. Large banks tend to have more customers and resources that give 
them an informational comparative advantage. Small firms which are usually considered as 
opaque are less likely to switch banks (Gopalan et al., 2011)5. Hence bank size may be an 
important driver in determining the level of switching costs.  
     Operational efficiency differs between banks and it is likely that the degree of 
switching costs will also depend on the efficiency of the bank’s ability to exploit the 
advantage of asymmetries information6.  Banks also can create barriers for consumers to 
change suppliers (Smidt et al., 2006). Strategies that strengthen the bank-firm relationship 
increases the degree of switching costs and multiple bank relationships is an effective 
response by firms to reduce the bank’s lock-in power. 
     Liability management remains undeveloped in Chinese banks and customer deposits 
funding remains the principal source of funds for lending. Loan growth has averaged 28.8% a 
                                                          
5 Information sharing by banks will reduce switching costs (Gehriga and Stenbecka, 2007) but in China 
information sharing is confined to negative information. 
6 Berger et al. (2005) argue that small banks are better able to collect and act on “soft”6 information 
than large banks. 
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year between 2003 and 2011. Firms are more likely to switch banks when credit conditions 
are light and strong deposit funding and therefore availability of credit may also be a 
significant driver. 
     Based on above analysis, we use the switching costs as the dependent variable 
regressed on the bank characteristics (a measure the degree of asymmetric information, 
operational efficiency, and artificial barrier and funding sources) and a set of macro variables 
(macroeconomic measures of the economy and industry). That is: 
                                     𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼1 +𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡              (16) 
, where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 stands for bank characteristics, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a set of macroeconomics variables. 
  Following Kim et al (2003), it can be shown that bank profits will depend positively 
on switching costs. But the literature on bank profitability also shows that profits are linked to 
bank characteristics and macroeconomics variables as in Stephan et al (2009) and Gopalan et 
al (2011): 
                               𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽2 +𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (20) 
     Based on above analysis, the systems model of switching costs determination and 
profitability determination is given as: 
𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)it + 𝛼2𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 
                                                  +𝛼5𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐶𝑅 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                     (21) 
                              𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2ln (Size)it + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 
                                                  𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐶𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (22) 
In equation (21) and (22), switching costs are values, which have been evaluated according to 
the method of Shy (2002) and described in the appendix. GGDP stands for annual growth rate 
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of real GDP, which measures the macro effect on switching costs. Other variables are banks’ 
characteristic variables. Details of each variable are described below: 
Return on asset (ROA), which is measured as net income over total assets. The 
switching costs will be reinforced through better using of asymmetric information. Hence, 
switching costs is expected to have a positive impact on profits. 
Bank Size (SIZE) is defined as total asset. Stephan et al (2009) find that bank size has a 
negative effect on firm’s switching behavior, which suggests that large banks have a stronger 
lock-in power. Large banks have more client and branches than small banks, which strength 
the asymmetric informational comparative advantage and lock-in power. Hence bank size is 
expected to have a positive effect on switching costs.  
Non-interest expense ratio (NEI), is defined as the ratio of non-interest expense over 
income on loans, provides information on variations in operating costs. The ratio reflects a 
firm's efficiency in generating profits and measures the level of management efficiency. Low 
NEI reflect efficient management, skilled employers and low bureaucracy enable stronger 
lock-in and improve profitability. Non-interest expense ratio is expected to have a negative 
influence on switching costs but positive effect on profits. 
Non-interest income ratio (NIR), is defined as Non-interest income over total gross 
income, measures the income structure of banks. Banks with high non-interest income ratios 
indicate a wider range of off-balance sheet business, which strengthens the lock-in power of 
the banks through strategic cross-selling to borrowers. 
Capital ratio (CAP) is expected to have positive relationship with profits of banks, 
which is measured by total equity over total asset. Capital ratio reveals capital adequacy and 
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captures the general average safety and soundness of the financial institution. Banks with 
higher capital to asset ratios are considered relatively safer compared to institutions with 
lower ratios. Safer banks will normally have a lower cost of external funding, which has a 
positive effect on their profitability.    
Fund source (DEP) is captured by the total deposit over total assets, which is expected 
to have a positive effect on switching costs and profits. Deposits remain the major source of 
funding for banks in China.  
Annual growth of GDP (GGDP) is expected to have a positive relationship with 
switching costs. It is commonly accepted that the demand for lending is pro-cyclical. Banks’ 
market power will rise with an increase in demand for bank lending. Then consumers will be 
charged higher interest rate when switching banks.  
Market concentration ration (MCR) measures the loan market structure in the banking 
industry by means of the market concentration variable, which is defined as the ratio of the 
five largest banks’ assets to the total assets of the entire banking sector. A higher market 
concentration ratio may result in higher rates being charged on loans and lower interest rates 
being paid on deposits. On the other hand, a higher bank concentration might be the result of 
a tougher competition in the banking industry, which would suggest a negative relationship 
between performance and market concentration (Boone and Weigand, 2000).  
An important difference between the banks in China is their heterogeneity in 
operation. The SOBs operate nationally and are constrained to operate throughout the nation. 
The JSBs have the jurisdictional capability to do the same but concentrate on the 
economically profitable regions of the eastern coastal area. The CCBs and RCBs operate 
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within the provincial and rural area. Therefore the backgrounds for different categories of 
banks are not same. These differences are captured by dummy variables. Similarly it is argued 
that big bank have less motivation to lock-in their client, therefore bank size dummy variables 
are included to test whether the banks with different sizes have different switching costs.  
     We include control dummy variables for regions and foreign ownership. RD is a 
regional dummy where the HQ is in the east part of China = 1, otherwise 0. FD measures 
foreign banks as 1, and domestic banks as 0. Foreign banks are newcomers to banking market 
in China. Compared with local banks, foreign banks are lack of network relationship. 
Domestic banks include large commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city and rural 
commercial banks. Large commercial banks are the biggest banks in China, established 
earliest and now taking largest share of the banking market. Joint-stock commercial banks, 
city and rural commercial banks are usually considered as having higher efficiency and better 
services than large commercial banks. 
    Large banks dummy (LD) measures bank asset larger than 10000 Billion CNY in 2010 as 
1, otherwise 0.   Medium size banks dummy (MD measures bank asset smaller than 10000 
Billion CNY and larger than 1000 Billion CNY in 2010 as 1, otherwise 0.  Small size banks 
dummy (SD) measures bank asset smaller than 1000 Billion CNY, in 2010 as 1, otherwise 0.  
Table 2 summarises the variables. 
Table 2: Variable Definition 
Variables Definition Unit 
SC Estimated value according to Shy (2002) - 
ROA Net income over total asset % 
SIZE Annual total asset of Banks Mil CNY 
NEI  Non-interest expense over income on loans % 
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NIR Non-interest income over total gross income % 
CAP Total equity over total asset % 
DEP Total deposit over total assets % 
GGDP Annual growth ratio of real GDP % 
MCR Share of the five largest banks % 
RD Headquarter of bank located in east region of 
China equal to 1, otherwise 0 
- 
FD Foreign banks equal to 1, otherwise 0 - 
LD Bank asset >1×107 Mil CNY  = 1 - 
MD 1×107 Mil CNY > Bank asset > 1×106 Mil CNY 
= 1  
- 
SD 1×106 Mil CNY > Bank asset = 1 - 
 
5. Data   
The bank-level data are collected from BANKSCOPE. Only commercial banks are included 
in the sample. In addition, the sample excludes the banks whose market share is less 0.01%, 
which can be neglected when doing the nationwide research. The sample contains 151 banks 
in 8 years data, from 2003 to 20107. Some banks have zero cells for data during some years in 
financial reports, creating gaps in the data set. Hence the regression data is unbalanced8. Total 
loans of the sample banks take an average 74.7% of total loans in lending market9 of China.  
Table 3 shows the average switching costs, which are estimated according to the method of 
Shy (2002)10, in different groups of banks in sample year. Due to a lack of reported data, 
foreign banks’ switching costs cannot be calculated for 2003 and 2004. 
Table 3:  Estimated switching costs of banks (% of loans) 
                                                          
7 China Banking Regulatory Commission established in 2003, which indicated China banking market 
entry into a new age. So here the sample begins from 2003. 
8 These gaps appear randomly and it is not expected to bias the results. See Woolridge (2009). 
9 Total loans include the loans from banks and trust companies. 
10 The method of estimation is described in the appendix. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Large commercial banks 
4.62 4.56 4.82 5.14 6.16 6.67 4.69 4.71 
Joint-stock commercial banks 
3.84 5.08 5.21 5.21 5.90 6.57 4.72 5.01 
City and rural commercial 
banks 
3.89 4.14 4.86 4.59 4.91 5.96 4.65 4.96 
Foreign banks 
NA NA 3.56 4.77 2.70 4.64 3.11 3.20 
     
     A summary of the variables used in the model are presented in table 4. Several facts 
are worth noting. The gaps between the max and min numbers of switching costs and other 
bank characteristics are very large, which indicate heterogeneity performance among banks. 
Switching costs ranges from 0.45 to 9.78, reflecting big difference in lock-in power11. The 
average market share is 0.945. The smallest market share numbers in each year is either a city 
commercial bank or a rural commercial bank, while the highest one is ICBC in 2004. 
Although the maximum value of ROA is very large, it is an occasionally value. Most ROA of 
banks are below 2% with average value of ROA is 1.335% in the sample. The large 
commercial banks hold the largest market share, but do not have the highest profit rates. This 
is likely to show that the ability to generate profit is not based on market share.  
Table 4:  Summary Statistics12 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Key variables 
                                                          
11 The lowest value is switching costs of China Zheshang Bank in 2004. In 2004, China Zhejiang 
Commercial Bank was reorganized and started business as a new private bank. The highest value is 
switching costs of Qishang Bank in 2008. On March 22, 2009, Zibo City Commercial Bank changed its 
name to Qishang Bank. 
12 Subgroup summary statistics are attached in appendix, table A1-A4. 
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SC (%) 512 4.831 1.415 0.450 9.758 
ROA(%) 630 1.335 1.226 -1.535 18.587 
Other bank’s characteristics 
SIZE (Mil CNY) 640 518846 1629853 2164.600 13458622 
NEI (%) 512 41.819 31.449 8.212 542.783 
NIR (%) 535 11.432 1.278 5.564 20.705 
CAP (%) 635 6.568 4.940 -13.714 42.024 
DEP (%) 631 75.394 16.866 0.027 103.364 
Macro Variables 
GGDP (%) 1216 16.311 3.927 8.552 22.881 
MCR (%) 1216 55.028 3.264 51.473 59.175 
 
6. Empirical results 
The system of equations is estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. The variables NEI, DEP 
and CAP are treated as endogenous. Lag vales of, SIZE, MCR, GGDP, CAP and DEP are 
used as excluded instruments.  Table 5 presents some selected results of the base line model. 
In column 2 we see that as expected, SIZE is a significant driver of switching costs. 
The large banks in China are the SOBs which have a nationwide branch network that is 
preferred by Chinese bank customers (Chun-Yu Ho, 2012) but also provides a stronger 
capability of lock-in strategy. Also, bigger banks have an advantage in exploiting the 
asymmetric information, gap with small firms (Gopalan et al, 2007). 
Table 5: Estimation for the Simultaneous Equations Model with 3SLS 
Variables SC Variables ROA 
Ln(SIZE) 0.111*** 
(3.326) 
SC 0.180*** 
(6.646) 
NEI -0.015*** Ln(SIZE) -0.010 
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(-3.723) (-0.445) 
DEP 0.021*** 
(5.065) 
NEI -0.010*** 
(-5.393) 
NIR 0.280*** 
(6.849) 
DEP 0.013*** 
(3.066) 
GGDP -0.042 
(-1.078) 
CAP 0.099*** 
(2.701) 
MCR -0.051** 
(-1.967) 
MCR -0.046*** 
(-3.078) 
Intercept 4.569*** 
(2.786) 
Intercept 1.794 
(1.308) 
R
2 
0.405 R
2 
0.362 
D.W. 1.643 D.W. 1.813 
Obs 277 Obs 312 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. 
     
As expected, non-interest expenditure which acts as a proxy for bank efficiency has a 
significant negative effect on switching costs. Efficient management will enable the banks to 
take advantage of its ‘information monopoly’ more effectively and increase banks market 
power to lock-in their customers. Greater access to funding measured by DEP has a positive 
significant relationship with switching costs as a liquid source of funding means greater 
bargaining power in lending and lock-in capability. The measure of income mix NIR is an 
indicator of the strength of the off-balance sheet business conducted by the bank. A bank that 
has significant earnings from services has the capability to cross-sell financial services with 
loan products creating a stronger lock-in effect. Other business relationships than the 
customer-loan relationship alone strengthen the bank-firm relationship.  
Market concentration (MCR) has a negative effect on switching costs which indicates 
the big banks which hold the ‘monopoly power’ tend to be less aggressive. In addition, small 
banks do not have enough resource to lock-in their customers effectively under this condition. 
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This suggests that switching costs will decrease when market become more concentrated 
(Tirri, 2007; Mercieca et al, 2008). 
     Column 4 of table 5 shows the base-line result for bank profits. It is clear that SC 
provides a source of hidden profit to the bank. This result is consistent with the prediction of 
theory (Klemperer, 1987; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992), indicating the lock-in power as an 
important variable in banks’ profit strategy. Banks benefit from higher switching costs, and 
then higher profit lead to strengthen the information asymmetries. Profit and SIZE has no 
significant relationship indicating the conventional finding of constant returns to scale for 
banks however, the market structure measured by the concentration ratio has a negative effect 
on profits indicating a perverse effect in the case of the Chinese banking market. This 
suggests that the concentrated market power of the big-5 SOBs in China is used to support 
loss-making social projects than the collusive behaviour associated with the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis. This result is similar to Dietricha and Wanzenried (2009), 
for Swiss banks. Banks with higher capital to asset ratios (CAP) are considered relatively 
safer compared to institutions with lower ratios and have access to lower funding cost. In 
addition, banks with higher equity to assets ratios will normally have a lower need of external 
funding, which has again a positive effect on their profitability (Dietricha and Wanzenried, 
2009; Vong and Chan 2006).  
We now turn to the analysis of the regional and ownership effect in the model. The 
East region of China takes an average of 65% and 64% loans and deposit respectively. 
Similarly, 66% of banks in the sample have their headquarters in east area of China. As the 
most developed area in China, the competition of the lending market is intensive. Some 
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scholars point out that the predator bank will pay the switching cost to poach new customers. 
Chen (1997) suggests that firms will ‘pay to switch’ to get new customers, and ‘pay to switch’ 
make the market more competitive. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) claims that small firms act 
aggressively and price low to attract new consumers which they can exploit in the future. 
Using the Bolivian credit registry data between 1999 and 2003, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) 
finds that banks follow a loss-leader strategy and initially discount the loan rate to attract new 
customers, and then after a period of about one and a half years, increase the loan rate. 
However, there is no evidence that fierce competition will lead to information sharing 
between banks, and reduce the asymmetric information. Therefore the regional difference is 
expected to have no effect on switching costs. However, intensity of competition in the 
profitable region of the East means that while the majority of lending goes on in those regions 
the profit rate is commensurately lower. 
Table 6: Structural Estimation with regional and foreign dummy 
Variables SC Variables ROA 
Ln(BANK SIZE) 0.085** 
(2.181) 
SC 0.174*** 
(6.582) 
NEI -0.014*** 
(-3.349) 
Ln(BANK SIZE) -0.010 
(-0.391) 
DEPOSITA 0.020*** 
(4.203) 
NEI -0.008***  
(-4.146) 
NIR 0.260*** 
(6.380) 
DEPOSITA 0.009*** 
(2.683) 
GGDP -0.041 
(-1.055) 
CAPITAL RATIO 0.085*** 
(2.721) 
MCR -0.067** 
(-2.522) 
MCR -0.055*** 
(-3.923) 
RD  0.156 RD -0.173** 
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(0.872) (-2.223) 
FD -0.431** 
(-2.463) 
FD -0.297** 
(-2.020) 
C 5.824*** 
(3.365) 
C 2.756*** 
(2.342) 
R
2 
0.411 R
2 
0.410 
D.W. 1.651 D.W. 1.820 
Observations 277 Observations 312 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 
As recent entrants to the China banking market, foreign banks are in the early stages 
of building a relationship network and accumulation of information in the local market. These 
factors create barriers to construct switching costs when they compete with domestic banks. 
For similar reasons, foreign banks earn lower profitability rates. 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) argue that larger firms tend to be lazier and lose their 
consumers to the smaller firm, which is known as ‘fat cat’ effect, with the larger firm being a 
nonaggressive “fat cat” and small firms being more aggressive in attracting and keeping 
consumers. Translating to the banking market this suggests that large size bank have less 
motivation in raising their switching costs, but small size banks will be more positive. To 
capture this effect we divide banks into three categories, large, medium and small size banks, 
to test whether the size effects have a significant difference on switching costs. Table 7 
summarizes our findings. 
Table 7: Structural Estimation of different bank size affecting on switching costs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable SC SC  SC SC 
Ln(BANK SIZE) 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.089** 0.137*** 
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(4.190) (3.713) (2.331) (3.328) 
NEI 
-0.016*** 
(-4.081) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.021) 
-0.016*** 
(-4.022) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.862) 
DEPOSITA 
0.020*** 
(4.900) 
0.021*** 
(5.141) 
0.022*** 
(5.166) 
0.020*** 
(4.881) 
NIR 
0.294*** 
(7.232) 
0.282*** 
(6.985) 
0.262*** 
(6.564) 
0.298*** 
(7.305) 
GGDP 
-0.015  
(-0.374) 
-0.032 
(-0.804) 
-0.047 
(-1.201) 
-0.020 
(-0.508) 
MCR 
-0.057** 
(-2.075) 
-0.061** 
(-2.147) 
-0.067** 
(-2.378) 
-0.063** 
(-2.232) 
LARGE× Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
-0.083*** 
(-3.181) 
-0.044** 
(-2.336) 
  
MEDIUM× 
Ln(BANK SIZE) 
-0.028 
(-1.545) 
 
0.006 
(0.400) 
 
SMALL× Ln(BANK 
SIZE) 
 
0.033** 
(2.014) 
0.037** 
(2.152) 
 
Ln(BANK SIZE)
2
    
-0.049* 
(-3.335) 
C 
0.830 
(0.397) 
1.949 
(1.043) 
3.869** 
(2.247) 
-3.798 
(-1.230) 
R
2
 0.429 0.430 0.417 0.431 
D.W. 1.726 1.722 1.659 1.722 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level.  
 
The results from Table 7 show that the interactive term LARGE× Ln(BANK SIZE) has a 
significant negative effect on switching costs but the interaction term SMALL× Ln(BANK 
SIZE) has a significant positive effect on switching costs. As a robustness test we use the 
square of bank size (ln(SIZE)
2) which has a significant negative relationship on switching 
costs at the 10% level indicating a potential non-linearity in the association. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the determinants of bank switching costs in terms of bank 
characteristics and macro variables and the influence of switching costs on banks’ profits. Our 
finds are fourfold: first, the relationship between bank size and switching cost is complex. 
Our results show that in general there is a positive relationship between bank size and 
switching costs. A rise in size and number of sub branches will strengthen information flow, 
reduce the problem of asymmetric information and strengthen its lock in power. However, 
small banks have a stronger motivation to increase their switching costs power, and extend 
their market share; while large banks are less aggressive, which is called the big banks’ ‘fat 
cat effect’ (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). However, we find that in China, the ‘very large’ 
banks have lower switching costs than ‘large’ banks suggesting a non-linear relationship 
between bank size and switching costs, where after some critical size switching costs decline. 
Second, Non-interest expense ratio (NEI), has a significant positive relationship with 
switching costs. This implies that efficient management can take advantage of asymmetries in 
information to enhance switching costs of banks. The switching costs also have a significant 
influence on the profits of banks, which indicates that switching costs provide a separate 
mechanism for profits generation. Third, the profit determination regression results show that 
market share has no significant effect on profits of banks. We also confirm other findings that 
the market concentration ratio has a negative effect both on switching costs and profits of 
banks. Fourth, as new-comers to the China banking market, foreign banks are in a weak 
position in raise switching costs. Banks in the east region face more intense competition and 
are less able to generate lock-in power. 
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The results highlight the effect of bank size and market concentration as two 
important variables in the determination of switching costs. In doing so these results confirm 
what is already widely known about the Chinese banking system. Market concentration has a 
negative effect on bank profitability which is out of step with the Structure Conduct 
Performance Hypothesis. Indeed, the more concentrated the banking market the lower the 
switching cost. We also find that the large banks are less concerned with the lock-in strategy 
of extracting rent from switching costs than the smaller banks, largely because the 
competitive pressure faced by the joint stock banks and city commercial banks are fiercer 
than that faced by the big-4 state-owned banks. Indeed our finding confirm the standard view 
that the SOBs have social objectives as well as profit objectives, which means maintaining 
branches in unprofitable regions and conducting investment in loss-making ventures as part of 
a wider social objective. As a result the switching costs and profit performance associated 
with the very large state-owned banks is lower than that of other commercial banks in China.  
While SOBs remain large and dominate the banking market, lower switching costs increase 
banks consumer welfare. As competition intensifies and the SOBs lose market share, banks 
will increasingly use their lock-in power to increase switching costs. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: List of banks in sample 
Large commercial bank Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank 
Industrial and commercial bank of China, Qishang Bank 
Agricultural bank of China Bank of Ningxia 
Bank of China China & South Sea Bank Ltd 
China Construction Bank Bank of Liaoyang 
Bank of Communications Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank 
Joint-stock commercial bank Jiangsu Wujiang Rural Commercial Bank 
China Citic bank Bank of Luoyang 
China Everbright Bank Wuxi City Commercial Bank 
Huaxia Bank First Sino Bank 
Guangdong Development Bank (China 
Guangfa Bank) 
Commercial Bank of Zhengzhou 
Shenzhen Development Bank (Ping An Bank) Xiamen Bank 
China Merchants Bank Lanzhou City Commercial Bank 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Zhejiang Xiaoshan Rural Cooperative Bank 
Industrial Bank Dongying City Commercial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation Bank of Guilin 
Evergrowing Bank Yantai Bank 
China Zheshang Bank Laishang Bank 
Bohai Bank Linshang Bank 
City and Rural commercial bank Nanchong City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Beijing Bank of Inner Mongolia 
Huangshi City Commercial Bank Bank of Jinhua 
Bank of Shanghai Kunshan Rural Commercial Bank 
Bank of Jiangsu Bank of Liuzhou 
Beijing Rural Commercial Bank Zhuhai City Commercial Bank 
Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank Taizhou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Ningbo Bank of Anshan 
Ping An Bank Suzhou City Commercial Bank 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Fuxin 
Bank of Nanjing Handan Commercial Bank 
Bank of Hangzhou Dezhou City Commercial Bank 
Xuchang City Commercial Bank Nantong City Commercial Bank 
Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Deyang 
Huishang Bank Yingkou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Tianjin Chinese Mercantile Bank 
Bank of Dalian Jiaxing City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Guangzhou Datong City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Chengdu Zhanjiang City Commercial Bank 
Dongguan Rural Commercial Bank Bank of Xinxiang 
Harbin Bank Ningbo Yuyao Rural Cooperative Bank 
Foshan Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Panzhihua City Commercial Bank 
Hankou Bank Nanning City Commercial Bank 
Shengjing Bank Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank 
Bank of Chongqing Bank of Jining 
Bank of Dongguan Changzhi City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Jilin Jiaozuo City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Jinzhou Huzhou City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Changsha Changshu Rural Commercial Bank 
Baoshang Bank Mianyang City Commercial Bank 
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Sin Hua Bank Cangzhou City Commercial Bank 
United Rural Cooperative Bank of Hangzhou Ganzhou City Commercial Bank 
Xiamen International Bank Yangzhou City Commercial Bank 
Wuhan Rural Commercial Bank Hengyang City Commercial Bank 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank Jiujiang City Commercial Bank 
Guiyang Commercial Bank Chengde City Commercial Bank 
Bank of Qingdao Foreign Bank 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank HSBC Bank (China) 
Qilu Bank Standard Chartered Bank (China) 
Guangxi Beibu Gulf Bank Bank of East Asia (China) 
China Investment Bank Citibank (China) 
Fujian Haixia Bank Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ (China) 
Bank of Hebei 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
(China) 
Jiangsu Jiangyin Rural Commercial Bank DBS BANK (China) 
Jiangsu Zhangjiagang Rural Commercial Bank Mizuho Corporate Bank (China) 
Fudian Bank Hang Seng Bank (China) 
Bank of Wenzhou Nanyang Commercial Bank (China) 
Kincheng Banking Deutsche Bank (China) 
Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank BNP Paribas (China) 
Bank of Nanchang OCBC Bank (China) 
National Commercial Bank Royal Bank of Scotland (China) 
Bank of Jiujiang United Overseas Bank (China) 
Bank of Weifang Australia and New Zealand Bank (China) 
Weihai City Commercial Bank JP Morgan Chase Bank (China) 
Ningbo Yinzhou Rural Cooperative Bank Woori Bank (China) 
Bank of Rizhao Wing Hang Bank (China) 
China State Bank Hana Bank (China) 
Bank of Shaoxing Shinhan Bank (China) 
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Bangkok Bank (China) 
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The method to estimate switching cost: 
Switching costs are calculated through each year’s cross section data. First we got the lowest 
market share (𝑁𝐿𝑡) of bank in year 𝑡. Then multiply the corresponding bank’s average interest 
rate (𝑃𝐿𝑡), which calculated by income from loans divided by total loans. Accordingly we get 
the switching costs of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
 
                       𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −
𝑃𝐿𝑡𝑁𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                    (A.1) 
 
, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is average interest rate of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is market share of bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  
Taking the interest rate (𝑃1𝑡) and market share (𝑁1𝑡) of biggest market share bank data into 
the follow equation to calculate the lowest market share bank’s switching costs in year 𝑡, with 
the data of 𝑃𝐿𝑡 and 𝑁𝐿𝑡. 
 
         𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = 𝑃𝐿𝑡 −
𝑃1𝑡𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1𝑡+𝑁𝐿𝑡
                   (A.2) 
The example below illustrates; 
Example: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market share 40% 30% 20% 10% 
Average interest rate 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.4 
 
In this example, Bank 4 is the smallest bank. Therefore: 
SC1 = P1 −
P4N4
N1+N4
= 5.5 −
5.4∗10%
40%+10%
= 4.42  ; 𝑆𝐶2 = 𝑃2 −
𝑃4𝑁4
𝑁2+𝑁4
= 5.3 −
5.4∗10%
30%+10%
= 3.95   
𝑆𝐶3 = 𝑃3 −
𝑃4𝑁4
𝑁3+𝑁4
= 5.6 −
5.4∗10%
20%+10%
= 1.80  ; 𝑆𝐶4 = 𝑃4 −
𝑃1𝑁1
𝑁1+𝑁4
= 5.4 −
5.5∗40%
40%+10%
= 1.00   
 
